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Abstract 
Historical literature has traced US efforts to bring Latin American countries over to 
the side of the Allies in WWII. Following a period of hesitation and negotiation with 
the US and Germany, the Brazilian government aligned itself with the US. What 
remains virtually unknown is the involvement of scientists in these diplomatic 
arrangements. Recently unearthed material has shown that Arthur Compton’s 1941 
trip to a scientific conference on cosmic rays in Brazil was linked to efforts led by the 
Office for Inter-American Affairs under Nelson Rockefeller. For the Brazilian 
physicists, who, under the leadership of Gleb Wataghin, had excelled in this area of 
research during the late 1930s, science was a strong motivation for the visit; it was 
not, however, devoid of political connotations and professional interests. 
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Introduction 
The intensity of the cultural and scientific hegemony of the United States, in 
particular in relation to Latin America, in the second half of the 20th century, 
necessarily leads observers to question how this relationship could have been 
established.  In other words, it is a power relationship, which was created historically 
and should not be naturalized as if it were an inevitable consequence, for example, of 
a supposed Pan American identity or geographical determinism. To illustrate this 
historical construction, we may remind ourselves of the case of the creation of 
Brazilian universities.  In the 1930s, the founders of the University of São Paulo 
(Universidade de São Paulo: USP), the Federal District University and the University 
of Brazil, sought to attract qualified teachers from Europe, in particular from France, 
Italy and Germany.2 They did not think of seeking such resources in the United 
States.  Following the Second World War, however, the United States was 
transformed into a Mecca for the training of Brazilian researchers, although training 
in European countries was still, secondarily, considered. 
It appears, then, that the construction of this North American hegemony must 
be considered as a process resulting from the outcome of the Second World War and 
the polarization of the Cold War that followed it.  In fact, at least in terms of the 
hegemonic scenario of North American science set against that of the European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 SCHWARTZMAN, Simon. Um espaço para a ciência: A formação da comunidade 
científica no Brasil. Brasília: Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, 2001, 154-179. This 
book is a Portuguese translation of SCHWARTZMAN, Simon. A space for science: 
the development of the scientific community in Brazil. University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1991. 
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Continent, this was the well-articulated thesis of the historian John Krige in his 
American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe.3 In this 
work, however, we will argue that, at least in the Brazilian case, the hegemony which 
will coalesce after the Second World War was prepared and anticipated by procedures 
of cultural diplomacy undertook by the United States between the eve and the 
beginning of the engagement of that country in the Second World War. If cultural 
hegemony came as outcome of the war, it was early prepared by the American 
cultural diplomacy.4 We will also argue that in this process the Brazilian elite, 
particularly the scientific elite, actively sought out this realignment, demonstrating 
that this was not a process imposed on Latin America from the outside. Certainly 
there was a different scenario during the period following the Second World War. 
The first part of this thesis is analogous with that defended by Gerson Moura, 
in his Tio Sam chega ao Brasil: A penetração cultural Americana, when he states that 
“to be more exact, the visible arrival of Uncle Sam in Brazil really occurred at the 
beginning of the 1940s, under well-defined conditions and with a clear purpose.” The 
second part, however, moves away from that author’s position, since he discusses the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 KRIGE, John. American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in 
Europe. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006. 
4 For the concept of cultural diplomacy, see CULL, Nicholas J. Public Diplomacy: 
Taxonomies and Histories. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, v. 616, p. 31-54, 2008. American cultural diplomacy in the 20th 
century is presented in ARNDT, Richard T. The First Resort of Kings – American 
Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 
2005. In this book, one of the chapters, pp. 75-97, presents the character and the 
period we are interested in this paper: Nelson Rockefeller, 1940-1945. 
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North American cultural influence on Brazil that developed during this period in 
terms of “ideological penetration and market gains”, thus, unlike our thesis, 
attributing a passive role to the Brazilian elite who participated in this process.  In the 
same way, the first part of the thesis coincides with the position of Antonio Tota in his 
book O imperialismo sedutor: A americanização do Brasil na época da Segunda 
Guerra. The title of Antonio Tota’s book (Seductive Imperialism) is loaded with the 
metaphor of seduction, suggesting a certain passivity on the part of the Brazilian elite 
protagonists.  This impression is only dissipated in the book’s final chapter, when the 
author discusses how “our Americanization obviously did not happen passively.”5 
Our argument will be developed by analysing the activities of the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), a body of the North American State 
run by Nelson Rockefeller, which specifically functioned between 1941 and 1945, 
related to the visit of a North American scientific committee to Brazil.  This 
committee was led by the physicist Arthur H. Compton, from the University of 
Chicago, winner of the 1927 Nobel Prize for Physics, with the aim of participating in 
research and in a conference about cosmic rays held in Rio de Janeiro in 1941.  While 
Compton’s visit is well documented in the literature on the history of physics, 
historians have overlooked his diplomatic connection. 
This work poses historians of science with the challenge of overcoming the 
obstacle of locating science in history rather than merely writing a history of science.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 MOURA, Gerson. Tio Sam chega ao Brasil: A penetração cultural americana. 3ª 
edição. São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1986, pp. 8 and 11. TOTA, Antonio Pedro. O 
imperialismo sedutor: A americanização do Brasil na época da Segunda Guerra. São 
Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2010, p. 191. 
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To explain more clearly - we are dealing with two relatively well-known processes, 
which have not previously been connected.  On the one hand, diplomatic relationships 
between the United States and Brazil between 1935 and 1945, which led to Brazil 
aligning itself with the Allies and to its entry into the Second World War.  This 
process has been well documented, including in classic works, such as in the books of 
Gerson Moura and Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira.6 Despite the existence of this 
literature, however, the activities of the OCIAA, whose Brazilian committee was run 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 MOURA, Gerson. Autonomia na Dependência: A política externa brasileira de 1935 
a 1942. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1980; BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto 
Moniz. Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização 
Brasileira, 2007. For a review of the literature, see, ALVES, Vagner Camilo. O Brasil 
e a Segunda Guerra Mundial: História de um envolvimento forçado. Rio de Janeiro: 
Editora PUC Rio e Editora Loyola, 2002. See also FAUSTO, Boris (ed.). (2007). 
História Geral da Civilização Brasileira: O Brasil republicano. Tomo III, Volume 1. 
Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2007; and CERVO, Amado e BUENO, Clodoaldo. 
História da política exterior do Brasil, 3a Ed. ampliada, Brasília: Editora UnB, 2010, 
pp. 233-267.  For a comparison between Brazil and Argentina in the same period, see 
FAUSTO, Boris e DEVOTO, Fernando. Brasil e Argentina – um ensaio de história 
comparada (1850-2002). São Paulo: Editora 34, 2004. The proximity between Brazil 
and the United States, however, dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, an 
observation for which we would like to thank Henrique Altemani. On this theme, see 
RICUPERO, Rubens. O Brasil, a América Latina e os EUA desde 1930: 60 anos de 
uma relação triangular. In ALBUQUERQUE, José Augusto Guilhon (org). Sessenta 
Anos de Política Externa Brasileira (1930-1990): Crescimento, Modernização e 
Política Externa. São Paulo: NUPRI-USP / Cultura Editores Associados, 1996, p. 37-
60.  For an examination of this approach, under the aegis of Rio Branco, and its 
influence on scientific congresses, see SUPPO, Hugo Rogélio. Ciência e relações 
internacionais – o congresso de 1905. Revista da SBHC. Rio de Janeiro: SBHC, 1, p. 
6-20, 2003. 
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by the businessman and political advisor Berent Friele, have received scarce, if any, 
attention from historians focusing on the history of relationships between Brazil and 
the United States. On the other hand, we have the flowering of research into the 
physics of cosmic rays at the University of São Paulo, under the leadership of the 
founder of its Department of Physics, the Russian-Italian Gleb Wataghin.  Historians 
have paid attention to this process, drawn by Brazilian physics’ uniquely rapid 
acquisition of a reputation for international excellence.  The generation that was thus 
trained includes Cesar Lattes, who, even today, is the Brazilian experimental physicist 
with most extensive international profile.  The connection between these two 
processes, however, has been overlooked both by historians of science and by 
historians tout court, and this is the aspect which our study intends to explore. 
Before following with our narrative, let us comment a little further the scant 
attention in the literature to the activities of the OCIAA and its Brazilian committee. 
Positive exceptions to this lacuna are the works of Gerson Moura and Antonio Tota. 
In the booklet Tio Sam chega ao Brasil, published in 1986, Gerson Moura took up the 
theme again, looking at the role of Berent Friele as Coordinator of the OCIAA’s 
Brazilian committee.  Although an important work, given its uniqueness in national 
literature, in our opinion this booklet does not adequately explore the primary sources 
and treats the themes of science and education in these relationships very generically. 
The book O imperialism sedutor, written by Antonio Tota, however, adequately 
explores primary sources, in particular the North American archives, and makes an 
essential historiographical contribution to the theme.  Unfortunately, for our purposes, 
however, Tota pays little attention to the spheres of education, science and 
technology, dedicating only two pages to this. Lira Neto, in the recently published 
8	  	  
book, Getúlio 1930 – 1945, notes the OCIAA’s activities, Rockefeller heading it, and 
its support to Walt Disney’s journey to Brazil as well as its support to the medical 
training of Vargas’ brother, Lutero.7  One conspicuous gap is Luiz Alberto Moniz 
Bandeira’s book, Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil, in which no reference is 
made to the OCIAA; Nelson Rockefeller appears only as a businessman and not a 
diplomat, while Berent Friele is an illustrious absence. In an earlier book, Autonomia 
na Dependência: A política externa brasileira de 1935 a 1942, published in 1980, 
Gerson Moura drew from the secondary literature, that is, from Gerald Haines’ study, 
which, more than forty years ago, stated that, “While much has been written on the 
political and economical efforts of the Roosevelt administration to ensure the safety 
of the American continents during this period, little attention has been focused on the 
far more subtle attempts by Roosevelt and his advisers to promote hemispheric 
cooperation and unity and to make the New World an American hemisphere.” As far 
as we have been able to review the literature, the Haines study was not followed up.  
Thus, the archives relating to the OCIAA, as relevant as they may be for the history of 
Latin America, remain a territory as yet under-explored by historians.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The positive exceptions are (MOURA, 1980, pp. 139-141), (MOURA, 1986) and 
(TOTA, 2010). Science and education in the relationship Brazil- USA is approached 
in (MOURA, 1986, pp. 47-50) and (TOTA, 2000, pp. 80-82). NETO, Lira. Getúlio 
1930-1945: Do governo provisório à ditadura do Estado Novo. São Paulo: Companhia 
das Letras, 2013, pp. 397 e 468. 
8 (BANDEIRA, 2007). (MOURA, 1980). (HAINES, Gerald. Under the Eagle’s Wing: 
The Franklin Roosevelt Administration Forges an American Hemisphere, Diplomatic 
History, Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 1, 4, p. 373-388, 1977, p. 373). 
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The work is organized in the following way: the first part is dedicated to a 
brief review of the context and literature regarding Brazilian diplomacy throughout 
the 1930s and during the Second World War, which constitutes the historical 
background of Compton’s visit in the mid-1941; while the second, which results from 
original historical research, explores the connections between the scientific and 
political aspects of Arthur Compton’s visit to Brazil in 1941.  In this part, information 
about the political positions of Paulus Aulus Pompéia and Gleb Wataghin throw light 
on as yet unexplored aspects of the literature regarding the history of science.  In the 
conclusion, we draw certain implications for the historiography of science. 
 
1. The Brazil - Germany – United States triangle in the 1930s 
Brazil’s entry into the Second World War in 1942 on the side of the Allied forces was 
the result of one of the most complex processes of our diplomatic history.  The 
Vargas government, a product of the 1930 revolution, and from 1937 a dictatorship 
resulting from the New State’s coup d’état, contained disparate tendencies in a world 
polarized by the ascension of Nazism in Germany in 1933.  The government 
accommodated both modernizing projects and pro-fascist tendencies. Modernizing 
projects came from the tenente movements of the 1920s, resulted in the 
developmentalist trends in Brazilian politics, and combined with liberal tendencies, 
personified by Oswaldo Aranha, minister of Foreign Affairs. The pro-fascist 
tendencies were represented by Generals Eurico Gaspar Dutra and Góis Monteiro.  
Throughout the 1930s, Vargas sought to exploit the international polarization to 
advance his own agenda, which specifically involved the construction of a large-scale 
10	  	  
steel mills and the modernization of armaments for the armed forces.9  According to 
Cervo and Bueno, diplomatic historians, “in historiography there is a certain 
consensus that Brazil played a ‘double game’ in relation to the United States and 
Germany, in the period leading up to the Second World War, using it as a bargaining 
position.  This game was facilitated by growing German participation in Brazil’s 
foreign trade in the period between 1934 and 1938, at the same time as a decline in 
both the North American and English presence in the country’s imports and 
exports.”10 
If this was the Brazilian game, then what game did the other actors, in 
particular the United States and Germany, play during the 1935 – 1941 period of 
Brazilian foreign policy, which Moura (1980) described as “pragmatic equidistance”?  
Nazi Germany, willingly accepting Vargas Government policy and exploiting the 
legal framework of the Brazil-Germany Compensation Adjustment, became Brazil’s 
largest trade partner, overtaking England and the United States and using economic 
exchange for political approaches, both to government members and to integralistas, 
from the fascist-inspired Brazilian party, as well as to German immigrants settled in 
the south of the country.  The outbreak of war in 1939, however, limited the scope of 
German manoeuvres, as a specific result of the naval blockade imposed by England 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 LEVINE, Robert M. Father of the poor? Vargas and his era. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998; LEVINE, Robert M. & CROCITTI, John J. (eds), 
The Brazil Reader: history, culture, politics. Durham: Duke University Press, 1999; 
HENTSCHKE, Jens R. (ed.), Vargas and Brazil: new perspectives. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. SKIDMORE, Thomas E. Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: an 
experiment in democracy. New York, Oxford University Press, 1967. 
10 (CERVO e BUENO, 2010, p. 234) 
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on German-Brazil trade.  Thus, only a portion of the armaments bought from Krupp 
arrived in Brazil and supplies for the construction of the steel mills sought by Vargas 
were promised for after the war.11 
At the beginning, the Americans were tolerant with trade between Brazil and 
Germany, even making economic offers to Brazil.  According to Moura, “all these 
concessions indicate that there was no absolute United States hegemony regarding the 
continent in general and Brazil in particular.”12 The evolution of the international 
political situation, particularly following the Spanish Civil War in 1936 and the 
outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, led the USA to prepare for a possible war 
scenario.  In this context, Latin America, and Brazil in particular, enjoyed greater 
importance in American foreign policy.  This is related to the consolidation of its 
influence in the hemisphere, at the same time neutralizing the influence of Axis 
countries in the region, in particular of Germany and Italy.  Brazil, specifically, 
acquired strategic military importance, given that the northeast projection around the 
city of Natal supplied a natural platform for North American aviation to fly to North 
Africa and Europe.  For this reason, while Moura calls the 1935 – 1937 period 
“possible equilibrium” and the period between 1938 and 1939 “difficult equilibrium,” 
the subsequent period was called “the ideological and political offensive by the 
United States (1939 – 1942).”  For the purposes of this work, we are particularly 
interested in this ideological offensive.  Based on the work of Gerald Haines, Moura 
described this North American offensive in the following manner: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 (CERVO e BUENO, 2010, pp. 253-7) 
12 (MOURA, 1980, pp. 98-9), 
12	  	  
But ‘Pan American’ values did not propagate spontaneously, nor were the 
continental conferences a sufficient instrument for their dissemination.  For 
this reason, the United States government adopted a series of measures to 
guarantee the success of the undertaking.  This was to give new 
encouragement to the already existing Pan American institutions and to 
American government bodies, such as the Cultural Division of the State 
Department and the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the 
American Republics.  Perhaps the more important decision was the creation 
of OCIAA (Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs) under the 
direction of Nelson Rockefeller and charged with counter-balancing growing 
Axis propaganda in Latin America.  The extent of this new body’s activities 
may be assessed by examining its aims: to persuade the Latin American 
nations to follow the leadership of the USA in opposition to the Axis, to 
integrate the American economy with that of the USA into one system, to 
prevent revolutions in the Americas, to fight against Axis agents and to 
increase United States trade.  And all this without giving the impression that 
they were interfering in the internal business of sovereign States.13 
The pinnacle of the “double game” played by Vargas was the speech he made in June 
1940 aboard the ship Minas Gerais, in which he signalled the possibility of Brazil 
aligning itself to the Axis powers, if this were to be a pathway for heavy 
industrialization, meaning the construction of the steel mills.  According to Cervo and 
Bueno, “the international situation was favourable.  With the advance of the conflict, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 (HAINES, 1977, pp. 379-380), as cited by (MOURA, 1980). 
13	  	  
this was the right moment: either Washington cooperated, straightaway, or a pathway 
to German cooperation would be opened up.” Germany offered to construct the steel 
mills when the war was over.  The speech frightened the North Americans, who 
speeded up government decisions to offer Vargas what he wanted, but negotiations 
were not yet concluded.  The precipitation of political and military events, in the 
following period, accelerated these undertakings.  In December 1941, Japan attacked 
Pearl Harbour, dragging the United States into the world war.  In January 1942, the 
Pan American Meeting was held in Rio de Janeiro; here the United States expected a 
rupture in diplomatic relations on the part of the Latin American states in relation to 
the Axis powers. There were obstacles, however, since Chile and Argentina defended 
a position of neutrality in face of the current conflict.  During the meeting, Vargas 
negotiated directly with Roosevelt for a guarantee of the construction of what would 
become the Volta Redonda steel mills and the rearmament of Brazilian military 
forces.  Vargas obtained both.  With this commitment in hand, at the end of the 
meeting the Brazilian president announced a rupture of diplomatic relations between 
Brazil and the Axis powers. 
According to Fausto and Devoto, in a comparative analysis of Brazilian and 
Argentinian foreign policies, “It is evident that the Vargas option revealed, at the 
same time, his non-ideological strategy and his political acumen, since alignment with 
the Allies took place when the Axis was still militarily victorious.”14  The military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 (CERVO e BUENO, 2010, p. 260); (FAUSTO e DEVOTO, 2004, pp. 272-8).  Our 
narrative approaches that of (MOURA, 1980) and diverges from (ALVES, 2002) to 
the extent that the latter eliminates the autonomy, however relative, of Vargas’ 
political activities, reducing them to a mere reflection of existing power relations. 
14	  	  
benefit for the United States was extremely significant.  It is estimated that, now with 
a modernized airport and a North American military presence, more than 25,000 
North American planes passed through Natal.  The rupture of relations made Brazil a 
target for German retaliations, with the sinking of several Brazilian ships.15  The 
epilogue of this history is well known.  Under the pressure of public opinion, which 
included both liberals and the imprisoned left, Vargas declared war on the Axis 
powers in August 1942, and this was followed by the preparation of the Brazilian 
Expeditionary Force, which fought in Italy on the side of Allied forces.16  This 
epilogue forms part of our national and international political memory.  In 2011, on 
visiting Brazil, the British Deputy Prime Minister began his statements by 
remembering that “[d]uring the Second World War, Brazilian soldiers fought 
alongside our forces in Italy.”17 
 
2. Compton’s visit to Brazil in 1941: science and diplomacy 
From the outset, approaches between the groups led by Arthur Compton in the United 
States and Gleb Wataghin in Brazil, contained a strong element of scientific 
collaboration of interest to both sides. Until the end of the 1920s, Compton had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See (SANDER, Roberto. O Brasil na mira de Hitler: A história do afundamento de 
34 navios brasileiros pelos Nazistas. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2011), a work notable 
for the quality of its narrative. 
16 For this support from the left, see Roberto Sisson’s letter to Vargas at the beginning 
of 1942, cited in (MOURA, 1980, 175). Sisson was one of the leaders of the ANL, the 
left political organization which was proscribed following the failed communist 
uprising of 1935. 
17 CLEGGE, Nick. Folha de São Paulo, 20 June 2011. 
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worked on X-ray scattering, work that earned him the Nobel Prize for Physics in 
1927.  After this, Compton changed direction, dedicating his time throughout the 
1930s to the study of cosmic rays. Through this study, he became involved in a heated 
controversy with Robert Millikan, also a Nobel Prize winner, about the nature of 
cosmic rays.  The controversy between these two physicists could have been resolved 
with the help of precise measurements of cosmic rays at several latitudes.   If X-rays 
were highly energetic photons, and therefore had no charge, as Millikan advocated, 
they would not suffer variations on interaction with the Earth’s magnetic field.  If, on 
the other hand, they were charged particles, different angles of incidence with the 
Earth's magnetic field at different latitudes would lead to different interactions.  
Compton and Millikan actively sought out these measurements.  Compton, in 
particular, organized an expedition at the beginning of the 1930s to undertake 
measurements at various latitudes; this included an excursion to Latin America.  The 
results revealed the latitude effect and Compton, in a dispute covered by the North 
American mainstream media, won the argument.18 Throughout the 1930s, Compton 
continued to improve his measurements, despite the resolution of this controversy.  In 
the second half of the decade, cosmic rays promised to shed light on another enigma 
of physics.  In 1934, the Japanese physicist Hideki Yukawa, in a work that won him 
the Nobel Prize, introduced the idea of a new force of nature, the strong or nuclear 
force, to explain the stability of the nucleus.  Yukawa’s hypothesis also involved the 
existence of a new particle, called the mesotron, later called the meson, an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 DE MARIA, M. and RUSSO, A. Cosmic Ray romancing: the discovery of the 
latitude effect and the Compton – Millikan controversy. HSPS, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 19(2), 211-266, 1989. 
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intermediate mass between the electron and the proton, which was the mediator of 
this new force.  Although the 1930s had seen the construction of the first particle 
accelerators, physicists’ hopes remained focused on cosmic rays, which were then 
more energetic than the particles produced in accelerators. What made this subject 
even more intriguing was the experimental data at the end of the 1930s, which 
appeared to suggest the existence of more than one mesotron.  In the 1940s, Compton 
therefore maintained his interest in something which had been his preferred subject 
for more than ten years, although already competing with the work he was doing with 
a number of other physicists at the University of Chicago, including Enrico Fermi, on 
nuclear fission; work which would later result in the Manhattan Project and the 
construction of the first atomic bomb. 
Gleb Wataghin was the founder of the Physics Department at the University of 
São Paulo.  Russian by birth, he had immigrated to Italy at the end of his adolescence, 
and there he concluded his secondary education, studying Physics and becoming a 
teacher at the Polytechnic of Turin.  In 1934, the founders of the University of São 
Paulo invited him to lead the Physics Department at the recently created university.  A 
little later on, in 1938, another Italian physicist, Giuseppe Occhialini, who had 
worked with P.M.S. Blackett in England, entered the same department.  Wataghin 
knew how to surround himself with talented and promising young people, such as 
Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos and Paulus Pompéia, the experimentalists, and Mário 
Schenberg the theorist, and how to choose a research topic – cosmic rays – that was 
relatively cheap but could, if it worked well, place the young São Paulo physics at the 
17	  	  
forefront of world physics.19 The research bore fruit, and at the end of the 1930s, they 
observed what at the time were called “penetrating showers,” that is, the production of 
various particles following the interaction of cosmic rays at the higher levels of the 
atmosphere.  Such results were significant for the study of mesotrons, or mesons, as 
these particles came to be called.  The São Paulo group took measurements at high 
altitudes, in aeroplanes and using balloons, and at depths of about 30 metres below 
the surface of the Earth.  Damy developed electronic techniques, which enabled them 
to gain accuracy in the measurements.20  As we shall see, it was these results that 
attracted Compton’s notice and shaped his interaction with the São Paulo physicists.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  (SCHWARTZMAN, 2001). COSTA RIBEIRO, Joaquim. A Física no Brasil. In 
AZEVEDO, Fernando (ed.). As ciências no Brasil, Vol 1. 2ª ed. [1ª ed. 1955]. Rio de 
Janeiro: Editora UFRJ, 1994, pp. 191-231. MOTOYAMA, Shozo. História da Física 
no Brasil. In MOTOYAMA, Shozo e FERRI, Mário Guimarães (Eds.). História das 
ciências no Brasil. São Paulo: EPU e EDUSP, 1979. BUSTAMANTE, Martha 
CECILIA. Giuseppe Occhialini and the history of cosmic-ray physics in the 1930s: 
From Florence to Cambridge and ANDRADE, Ana Maria Ribeiro. Occhialini’s 
trajectory in Latin America. In REDONDI, Pietro et al (Eds), The scientific legacy of 
Beppo Occhialini. Bologna: Italian Physical Society, 2006, pp. 35-49 and 51-69, 
respectively. VIDEIRA, Antonio Augusto Passos & BUSTAMANTE, Martha 
Cecilia. Gleb Wataghin en la universidad de São Paulo: un momento culminante de la 
ciência brasileña, Quipu, Cidade do México: SLHCT, 10, 3, 1993, p. 263-284.	  
20 WATAGHIN, Gleb; SOUZA SANTOS, Marcelo Damy and POMPÉIA, Paulus A. 
Simultaneous penetrating particles in the cosmic radiation, Physical Review, 57, 61, 
1940; idem, Simultaneous penetrating particles in the cosmic radiation, II, Physical 
Review, 57, 339, 1940. DAMY, Marcelo de S. S.; POMPÉIA, Paulus A. and 
WATAGHIN, Gleb. Showers of penetrating particles, Physical Review 59, 902-3, 
1941. 
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One should also note that Wataghin encouraged both the publication of results in 
international journals and the international circulation of young Brazilian physicists.  
Schenberg visited Europe before the outbreak of war, and later, with a grant from the 
Guggenheim Foundation, went to the United States, where he worked and published 
on astrophysics with George Gamow and Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar.21  Marcelo 
Damy de Souza Santos took up an internship in Cambridge, England and Paulus 
Pompéia went to the United States in 1940 to work with Compton, through an 
internship in Chicago.   
With the work about penetrating showers, Wataghin sought to establish 
scientific collaboration with Compton, which was well received by the North 
American.  Wataghin submitted his results to the North American journal Physical 
Review, but also sent them directly to Compton prior to their publication. “Thank you 
for sending on to me the manuscript of your ‘Letter’ to the Editor of the PHYSICAL 
REVIEW on ‘Showers of Penetrating Particles’,” acknowledged Compton in 1941. 
Compton continued to demonstrate evidence of his interest in intra-nuclear particles, 
as we can see in these experiments: “we also are getting evidence of mesotrons 
associated with extensive showers.”22 In this exchange of correspondence and through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Regarding Schenberg, see the introduction in HAMBURGER, Amélia Império 
(ed.). Obra Científica de Mario Schönberg: Volume 1 - de 1936 a 1948, São Paulo: 
EDUSP, 2010. On Schenberg and Chandrasekhar, see Davide Cenadelli, “Solving the 
Giant Stars Problem: Theories of Stellar Evolution from the 1930s to the 1950s,” 
Arch. Hist. Exact Sci. 64, 203–267, 2010.   
22 Compton to Wataghin, 4 January 1941. Series 02 Box 017. Folder: South America 
Expedition, 1941. Arthur Holly Compton Personal Papers. University Archives, 
Department of Special Collections, Washington University Libraries. (Hereafter 
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the correspondence between Wataghin and Pompéia, in December 1940, Wataghin 
was informed that Compton intended to organize a new expedition to South America 
(something he had undertaken at the beginning of the 1930s) to measure cosmic rays, 
and was including Brazil, and more specifically São Paulo, as one of the locations for 
these measurements.23 Wataghin reacted very positively to news of Compton’s 
expedition by stating that“[i]t was a great pleasure for me and for my co-workers to 
learn from yours and Mr. Pompeia letter, that you shall probably come to Brazil next 
summer.”24 Wataghin placed the resources of USP’s Physics Department at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
abbreviated as CP). In another letter, Wataghin declares, “I am sending to you 
herewith a copy o four letter to the Editor of Phys. Rev. concerning ‘Showers of 
penetrating particles,’” and reveals that he has identified mesotrons in underground 
measurements of cosmic rays, as well as at high altitudes.  Wataghin to Compton, 26 
December 1940.  Series 02 Box 017. Folder: South America Expedition, 1941. CP. 
And, further, “I want to thank you also for sending a letter to the Editor of Physical 
Review, and for the very interesting informations on recent cosmic ray results 
obtained in your laboratory.” Wataghin to Compton, 12 November 1940. Series 02 
Box 017. Folder: South America Expedition, 1941. CP. 
23 Compton to Wataghin, 4 January 1941, Series 02 Box 017. Folder: South America 
Expedition, 1941. CP. In this letter, it was evident that the choice of São Paulo for the 
measurements which Compton was planning on South America’s Atlantic coast came 
from a suggestion made by Pompéia: “For this [balloon experiments near the 
magnetic equator] on advice of Pompeia we have tentatively selected the State of Sao 
Paulo in southern Brazil as a location where we can hope to recover the balloons 
which are sent up.” 
24 Wataghin to Compton 31 December 1940, Series 02 Box 017. Folder: South 
America Expedition, 1941. CP. And, further, “I was very glad to learn from 
Pompeia’s letter that you and Prof. Hilberry, Jesse, Hughes and Wollan are coming to 
Brazil” Wataghin to Compton, 12 April 1941, Series 02 Box 06. Folder 3, CP. This 
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Compton’s disposal and mobilized the university administration and the São Paulo 
government for logistical support, particularly for the measurements undertaken in 
balloons, which were carried out in the state of São Paulo.  As well as these 
initiatives, Wataghin sought support from the federal government in Rio de Janeiro 
and, with the support of the President of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, Arthur 
Moses, began to organize a Symposium about Cosmic Rays, to be held in Rio de 
Janeiro at the end of Compton’s visit.  This symposium was clearly a homage to 
Compton’s arrival, since the most important scientific discussions would take place in 
São Paulo before Compton went to Rio.25 As a follow up to these activities, Compton 
received an official invitation from Oswaldo Aranha, the Minister for External 
Affairs, for his visit and that of his committee.26  Compton’s visit was surrounded by 
success, as seen in the later publication of the symposium annals; today this 
symposium is a well-documented event in Brazil’s history of physics.27 
If Compton’s expedition to Brazil was highly successful in scientific terms, its 
political and diplomatic success appears to have been even greater.  As soon as news 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
letter ends with a debatable joke: “they will enjoy the trip, the Brazilian forests and 
the snakes (in captivity).”  
25 “Apparently the serious scientific conference will be here in São Paulo beginning 
the 30th since Wataghin says there are few physicists in Rio [...] the time there will be 
spent mostly in official entertaining.” W.P. Jesse to Compton, 20 July 1941, Series 02 
Box 017. Folder: South America Expedition, 1941. CP. 
26 Oswaldo Aranha to Compton, telegram, 28 April 1941; and Compton to Oswaldo 
Aranha, letter, 7 June 1941, Series 02 Box 06. Folder 3. CP 
27 Symposium sobre raios cósmicos. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1943. 
(BUSTAMANTE, 2006). (ANDRADE, 2006). 
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of the planned expedition began to circulate in the United States, Stephen Duggan, 
Director of the Institute of International Education, realized the political implications 
it could have, particularly as part of North American efforts to win over Latin 
American hearts and minds to the Allied side.  Thus it was that on 29th April 1941, he 
told Compton about an initiative to seek support for the expedition from Nelson 
Rockefeller: “I immediately wrote to Dr. Robert Caldwell, the associate of Nelson 
Rockefeller in charge of cultural relations with Latin America. I told him of our fine 
conversation and expressed the hope that he would get in contact with you to send 
you as a representative of our country under the auspices of the Coordinator’s 
Committee.”28  Compton also quickly understood these implications and reformulated 
the expedition in order to be able to take more physicists and their wives.  This led 
him to request an increase in the endowment promised by the North American 
government, from 5,000 dollars to 7,500, despite having declared that each individual 
would cover their wife’s expenses, and later added 3,000 dollars, so that the 
University of Chicago did not pay all the equipment expenses.29  The presence of the 
wives was part of the diplomatic mission, as confirmed by Compton’s assertion to 
R.G. Caldwell, from MIT and Rockefeller’s advisor, “in view of the cultural relations 
objectives of the expedition, I have encouraged the married members of the party to 
take their wives with them, [...] From our experience in Mexico and from our contacts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Stephen Duggan to Compton, 28 April 1941, Series 02 Box 017. Folder: South 
America Expedition, 1941. CP. 
29 Compton to R. G. Caldwell, 10 February 1941; R. G. Caldwell to Compton, 28 
April 1941, Series 02 Box 017. Folder: South America Expedition, 1941. CP 
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with Latin-Americans in this country, we believe that this will be of real advantage.”30  
Furthermore, Compton, because of his warm nature, was considered the right person 
for such an initiative. As E. Crossett highlighted, “I know of no one who could do a 
better job on cultural relations than you and your wife.”31  In later documents, 
Compton suggests that the participation of the OCIAA was even more significant than 
merely supporting a project already underway, by asserting that “in the summer of 
1941, the University of Chicago was requested by the Co-ordinator [sic] of Inter-
American Affairs to send a group of expeditions to South America and Mexico to 
collaborate with the cosmic ray investigators in those countries.”32  Compton fully 
accepted the double meaning, both scientific and political, of his expedition, by 
causing news of it to circulate around the USA.  According to a letter from W.P. Jesse 
to a colleague, “[t]he State Department is very keen for us to go as a sort of good will 
tour so the expedition is as much diplomatic as scientific, although the scientific 
results are most important just at this time.”33 The expedition’s political success may 
be assessed through Compton’s own opinion.  In 1942, as part of the proceedings for 
the reimbursement of expenses to OCIAA, Compton submitted a report in which he 
confirmed that “the most successful aspect of our South American work with regard 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Compton to R. G. Caldwell, 26 April 1941, Series 02 Box 017. Folder: South 
America Expedition, 1941. CP. 
31 E. Crossett to Compton, 26 August 1941, Series 02 Box 07. Folder: General (I). CP. 
32 Compton to F. Watson, 21 September 1942, Series 02 Box 07. Folder: General (II). 
CP. 
33 W. P. Jesse to G. R. Tatum, 23 April 1941, Series 02 Box 07. Folder: W. P. Jesse. 
CP. 
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to its influence on international relationships seems to have been the Symposium on 
Cosmic Rays, held under the auspices of the Brazilian Academy of Science at Rio de 
Janeiro during the first week of August, 1941.”34  The most significant opinion about 
this political and diplomatic success, however, came from Nelson Rockefeller, the 
director of the OCIAA, himself.  In May 1942, Compton reported to William P. Jesse, 
who was also part of the expedition to Brazil, “you may be interested that I had a 
discussion a few days ago with Mr. Nelson Rockefeller who told me that this 
expedition of ours, according to his reports, was the most successful one that had been 
undertaken thus far with regard to its stimulation of good relations between the 
Americas.”35 
Figura 1  
Legenda: Compton in Rio de Janeiro. In the first line, from left to right, Wataghin and 
Compton are the 2nd and the 4th. Source: Academia Brasileira de Ciências 
 
If this was the political perspective from the North American side, how did the São 
Paulo physicists assess the expedition’s success?  The first issue to consider is that the 
physicists, particularly Pompéia and Wataghin, were not naive in political terms.  The 
division between the Allies and the Axis powers divided the world, as noted by 
historian Eric Hobsbawm, who considered the Second World War to be a kind of civil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 A. H. Compton, “Report to the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs – University 
of Chicago South American Cosmic Ray Expedition, 1941, Series 03 Box 02. Folder: 
South America, 1941-1942. CP. 
35 Compton to W. P. Jesse, 11 May 1942, Series 03 Box 02. Folder: South America, 
1941-1942. CP. 
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war against fascism.36 Anti-fascism was part of the culture of the students who 
studied physics in São Paulo in the second half of the 1930s.  Amongst the first Italian 
lecturers invited to set up the University of São Paulo, some were convinced fascists, 
for example the mathematics lecturer Luigi Fantapié. Legend has it that Mário 
Schenberg stopped studying mathematics, moving to physics, because of his 
opposition to Fantapié’s fascism.37 Further, the state of São Paulo was opposed to the 
Vargas government and its intellectuals were predominantly liberal. Hobsbawm’s 
reference to civil war is significant because it signals that even for many Italians and 
Germans the struggle against fascism spoke louder than national loyalties.  Thus it 
was that Wataghin did not hesitate to declare to Compton his unequivocal alignment 
against the Axis powers, which included Italy, where he had been trained, and the 
Italian government, of which he was an employee, since he maintained professional 
ties with the University of Turin.  In 1942, he wrote, “I cannot say how much I regret 
not to have the possibility to fight against nazy on the russian front [sic]. I have 
broken any relation with Italy and have declared to be ready to fight for the United 
Nations. If my work could be of any use in the U.S.A. I should be happy to go there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 HOBSBAWM, Eric. The age of extremes: The short twentieth century 1914-1991. 
London: Penguin, 1994. However, Hobsbawm excluded regions under colonial rule, 
such as Africa, parts of Asia and the Far East, from what he called the “international 
ideological civil war”.  This theme is developed further in Chapter 11 of 
HOBSBAWM, Eric. How to Change the World: Tales of Marx and Marxism. 
London: Little, Brown, 2011, although in this chapter Hobsbawm is more interested 
in the European and Marxist component of anti-fascism. 
37 Paulus Aulus Pompéia, interviewed by Simon Schwartzman and R. Guedes, 
CPDOC/FGV, Rio de Janeiro, 1977. 
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and make some defence work.” We remark that Wataghin’s anti-fascist position has 
not been noticed by historians who have written about him.38 On 19th December 1941, 
immediately after the United States entered the war, W.P. Jesse finished a letter to 
Wataghin with a reference to the Soviet Union’s resistance to the Nazi invasion – “we 
are greatly thrilled by the latest Russian news!” –, which highlights the political 
feelings that the North American and USP physicists shared at that time.39  Pompéia 
also clearly identified with Brazilian liberals opposed to the Axis and did not disguise 
this.  Thus it was that, in a letter to the Vice-President of the USA on Pompéia’s 
return to Brazil, Compton presented him as someone on whom the United States 
could depend for the war effort, not only because of his technical abilities but also his 
politics: “he has shown his ability persistently to do hard work, skill in administration 
with attention to details, good understanding of technical problems, a thorough 
understanding of the difficulties of securing fast action from his own people and a 
complete loyalty to the cause of the United Nations.”40  Further, judging by 
Compton’s words, he was the principal driver of the expedition to Brazil.  On seeking 
priority transportation from the government of the United States for Pompéia’s return, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Wataghin to Compton, 8 August 1942, Series 03 Box 02. Folder: South America, 
1941-1942. On Wataghin, see (VIDEIRA e BUSTAMANTE, 1993) and PREDAZZI, 
Enrico. Gleb Wataghin. In ROERO, Clara Silvia (org.). La Facoltà di Scienze 
Matematiche Fisiche Naturali di Torino 1848-1998, 2 Vols., Vol. II, Torino: 
Deputazione subalpina di storia pátria, 1999, pp. 283-294. 
39 W. P. Jesse to Wataghin, 19 December 1941, Series 02 Box 07. Folder: W. P. Jesse. 
CP. 
40 Compton to H. A. Wallace, 22 July 1942, Series 02 Box 07. Folder: Cosmic Ray-
Meteorology, 1941-1942. CP, our italics. 
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Compton asserted, “it happens that Dr. Pompeia was the moving spirit which brought 
about the invitation for our Cosmic Ray mission in the summer of 1941 under the 
auspices of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.”41 
There is a second aspect to be addressed in order to understand the active 
attitude of the USP physicists in their support for Compton’s expedition.  This 
concerns the most significant scientific collaboration, under Compton’s leadership, in 
the field of cosmic rays. Through this collaboration, the USP physicists expected and 
obtained support for the supply of equipment for their research, as may be inferred 
from W.P. Jesse’s letter to Wataghin, confirming, “I am enclosing a copy of a letter 
from the Indiana Steel Company, which they sent me in reply to my inquiries about 
the magnet that you are interested in. We are also sending a copy of this to the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which sent us, sometime ago, a list of the things that you 
need. [...] We are sending to Professor Occhialini some mercury-vapor lamps, and we 
have on order for him some tungsten lamps.”42  The success of this second aspect 
was, however, greater than the expectations of the USP physicists, since the reference 
to the Rockefeller Foundation in the letter cited above deserves expansion. In fact, it 
could be said that Compton became the principal guarantor for the continued funding 
that the Rockefeller Foundation secured for the USP Physics Department from this 
date onwards, and for many years, even after the end of the Second World War.  On 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Compton to J. O. Bell, 14 August 1942, Series 02 Box 07. Folder: General (II). CP. 
42 W. P. Jesse to Wataghin, 19 December 1941, Series 02 Box 07. Folder: W. P. Jesse. 
CP. In 1945, Wataghin gives thanks, “I received also a letter from Dr. Victor Regener 
concerning the Geiger-counters. Many thanks for more this help you are giving to our 
work.” Wataghin to Compton, 12 June 1945, Series 03 Box 05. Folder: W, Z. CP. 
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23rd January 1942, the Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, H. M. Miller, who had 
accompanied Compton on his visit to Brazil, wrote requesting his opinion about an 
application for support made by Wataghin for an expedition to Peru, which had been 
discouraged by Miller.  However, Miller confirms, “although at the time I 
discouraged a formal request for this purpose, we might be able to reopen the question 
if assured of the importance of the work to be done ... before taking any step in this 
direction, we wish to have your considered opinion.”43 As Pompéia remembered 
much later: “When the war finished we had a very good relationship with Dr Harry 
Müller Jr [sic] of the Rockefeller Foundation.  I knew him in ’41 when I came with 
the American expedition.”44 
 The support offered by the Rockefeller Foundation to the São Paulo physicists 
is a theme deserving of more study, which we will develop in another research 
project. However, we would like to notice how badly the theme has been treated in 
the literature of history of science in Brazil. Simon Schwartzman, sociologist, In his 
Um espaço para a ciência: A formação da comunidade científica no Brasil, describes 
this support as having begun after the war, although, as we have seen, it began during 
the WWII and before the US’ engagement in the war; Joaquim Costa Ribeiro, in one 
of the first studies on the history of physics in Brazil, published in the early 1950s, 
dedicates a very generic paragraph to this theme in terms of dates and institutions; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 H. M. Miller to Compton, 23 January 1942. Record Group RF RG 1.1 - Projects 
Series 305 D Brazil. Box 13. Folder 117: University of São Paulo – Physics 1942-
1943, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York.  
44 Paulus Aulus Pompéia, interviewed by Simon Schwartzman and R. Guedes, 
CPDOC/FGV, Rio de Janeiro, 1977. 
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Shozo Motoyama, historian of science, in a paper on the history of physics in Brazil, 
does not address the subject, and Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos, physicist and 
protagonist of the events we are describing, in his biographical recollections, correctly 
points out the support from the Rockefeller Foundation to Brazilian physicists from 
1940 onwards; however, he incorrectly attributes support for Compton’s visit to this 
foundation, clearly not knowing about the role played by the OCIAA.45 
 
Conclusion 
As asserted at the beginning of this work, the idea of ideological penetration as a 
result of the OCIAA’s cultural initiatives suggests a passive attitude on the part of the 
Brazilians.  References to the creation of the Zé Carioca character by Walt Disney on 
his arrival in Brazil, as well as the welcome reception given by the Brazilians to one 
of Hollywood’s greatest filmmakers, Orson Welles, when he filmed a documentary 
concerning Brazilians, both sponsored by the OCIAA, appear to reinforce this 
passivity.46  In the cases of the physicists Wataghin and Pompéia, as we have seen, 
passivity would certainly not be the best way to describe how they acted to forward 
their professional and political agendas.  A more extensive analysis, however, of the 
way the Brazilians reacted to the OCIAA offensive has yet to be conducted and is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  SCHWARTZMAN (2001, p. 208); (COSTA RIBEIRO, 1994); (MOTOYAMA, 
1979) and Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos in Cientistas do Brasil, São Paulo: SBPC, 
1998, 517-530.	  
46 (MOURA, 1980, pp. 139-141). (TOTA, 200). The documentary filmed by Welles 
was not concluded in his lifetime.  Much later, in the 1990s, the film was finally 
edited, producing the masterpiece “It’s all true” about the saga of the jangadeiros 
(raft fishermen) who set sail from Ceará to take their grievances to President Vargas. 
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beyond the scope of this work.  We note, however, that the positive reaction to the 
North American presence, as stated by the Director of the OCIAA’s Brazilian 
committee, Berent Friele, that, “except among a few disgruntled persons activated by 
purely personal motives, there is no anti-American feeling left in Brazil,” was not 
maintained in the post-war period, as witnessed by the battles involved in the 
foundation of Petrobrás, the Brazilian state company for oil exploitation, and the 
Letter of Testament left by Vargas when he committed suicide in 1954.47   
Finally, seen retrospectively, it does not seem surprising that the OCIAA 
supported the expedition of a North American scientific leader to Latin America as 
part of their policy of cultural proximity and their efforts to neutralize the influence of 
the Axis powers in this part of the Americas.  What is surprising is that the theme is 
only now being addressed in a history article.  This brings us to the limitations of the 
history of science, correctly pointed out by the historian of science John Krige in the 
opening of his work about North American hegemony in the reconstruction of 
European science, when he signalled the existence of a “gulf between what diplomatic 
and economic historians take for granted about the capacity and behavior of the 
United States to build a world order aligned with its interests and our approach to 
such an issue (when it occurs to historians of science at all).”48  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Berent Friele, “Report of the Brazilian Division”, 25 May 1942, Rockefeller 
Family, Record Group #4, series Washington DC files – CIAA – Confidential 
Projects, folder #32, RAC. There is an abundance of literature regarding the episodes 
after the war, we refer here to (BANDEIRA, 2007, pp. 429-511) and (FAUSTO, 
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